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Abstract:
The article describes and discusses political and security trends in Serb-ma-
jority North Kosovo during the Serbia-Kosovo normalization process 
launched in 2011. Perspectives from the local Serb population in the face 
of the interests and policies of the governments of Serbia, Kosovo and the 
Western great powers that promote normalization are highlighted, showing 
that critical views of normalization and associated trends are widespread in 
North Kosovo. In this connection, it is argued that dissatisfaction and inse-
curity with normalization and associated trends also became present in the 
region’s political life, pointing to latent challenges to the legitimacy and sus-
tainability of normalization. 
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North Kosovo (hereafter the North), a 1,200 km²- region adjacent to 
Central Serbia composed of the municipalities of Leposavić, the Northern 
part of Kosovska Mitrovica (henceforth North Mitrovica), Zubin Potok and 
Zvečan, has been known as a flashpoint in the Balkans since the end of 
the 1990s Kosovo conflict. This is due to its overwhelmingly Serb popula-
tion, estimated at around 70,000 people (OSCE 2019),2 articulating with 
Belgrade to preserve institutions that were highly integrated with Serbia’s 
political system, obstructing the administrative framework established 
under international auspices in Kosovo in 1999 and Kosovo’s statehood 
after the latter’s 2008 declaration of independence.
This situation meant a de facto partition in Kosovo opposed by Kosovo 
Albanian leaders and the Western great powers, who backed Priština’s 
claim to sovereignty over the North. Solving this dispute became part of 
the European Union (EU)-mediated, United States of America (US)-sup-
ported Serbia-Kosovo normalization dialogue launched in 2011, whose 
progress became a condition for Serbia’s desired EU accession. By making 
concessions that partly dismantled its remaining institutions in the North, 
Serbia advanced EU accession negotiations while keeping a significant 
degree of influence in the North and not recognizing Kosovo’s independ-
ence. In its turn, Kosovo began expanding its authority in the North, a 
scenario seen by the Western powers as a stabilizing factor in the Balkans.
For its protagonists, thus, it can be said normalization has been a rela-
tive success, as Serbia, Kosovo and the Western powers attained some of 
their goals concerning the Serbia-Kosovo dispute and European integra-
tion. Similar assessments, however, hardly fit perspectives from most of 
the Northern Serb community, which was not meaningfully included in 
the negotiations. Although normalization’s declared intents included guar-
anteeing security and the protection of rights for Kosovo Serbs, as well as 
better life conditions in the region (UN 2010; Serbia 2013c, 2019b), critical 
views of the dialogue and the general security and political environment 
in ’normalization-era’ North are widespread among Northern Serbs, who 
overwhelmingly opposed living under Kosovo state authority.
In view of these conflicting perspectives, this paper describes and 
discusses political and security trends in normalization-era North. Atten-
tion is drawn to the perspectives and forms of political mobilization from 
the Northern Serb community in the face of the interests and policies of 
normalization’s protagonists, i.e., the EU (and its leading states) and the 
governments of the US, Kosovo and particularly Serbia as the North’s main 
2  Besides the Serb majority, other communities (circa 10,000 people), mainly Albanians 
and Bosniaks, also live in the North (OSCE 2019).
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supporter. In this connection, it is argued that local dissatisfaction and 
insecurity regarding normalization and associated trends became present 
in the region’s political life, pointing to latent challenges to the legitimacy 
and sustainability of normalization. 
By doing this, this paper aims to contribute to the literature on Kosovo 
Serb perspectives on peace-/state-building promoted by international 
and regional actors in Kosovo.3 It also hopes to contribute to debates on 
“stabilitocracy” in the Balkans, i.e., the contemporary pattern of relations 
according to which Western great powers seek geopolitical deference and 
the promise of stability from Balkan governments in exchange for toler-
ance and/or support for regimes with authoritarian features (Pavlović 2017; 
Bieber 2018).
The paper is structured as follows. The first section discusses the emer-
gence and features of the Serbian Northern Kosovo system, as well as devel-
opments in the region, as a product both of the post-war context and the 
historical Serb-Albanian conflict in and over Kosovo. Then, normalization, 
its implications, perspectives and reactions from the North are analyzed 
in two following sections, one corresponding to the first, so-called tech-
nical phase of negotiations; and the second, corresponding to the polit-
ical one and its aftermath. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in the 
last section. The article draws on the academic literature, policy papers, 
reports, official documents, press coverage, public opinion surveys and 
other material related to the paper’s theme.
2. The North: from the early post-war period  
to the normalization dialogue
The North Kosovo question and its developments during the normaliza-
tion process are a direct product of the Kosovo status dispute that appeared 
in the aftermath of the 1990s conflict. At the same time, they also have 
deeper historical roots whose imprint is an important input for under-
standing the emergence of the Serbian Northern Kosovo system and devel-
opments in the region since 1999. 
Namely, the late nineteenth century witnessed the rise of the competing 
claims of the Serbian and Albanian national programs over the territory 
of present-day Kosovo. Since then, as Serbs and Albanians took turns as 
dominant groups in the region, political orders associated with these 
programs were often accompanied by forms of domination, discrimina-
tion and inequality (or perception thereof) experienced by both nations in 
relation to each other. Throughout history, polarization between Serbs and 
Albanians at times led to violent confrontations that further contributed 




to exacerbate tensions in their relations (Ristanović 2019, 8–14; Vladisavl-
jević 2012, 34–35). In this connection, developments in Kosovo in the 1980s, 
when the region was an autonomous province within Serbia in socialist 
Yugoslavia, are of particular importance, as they inaugurated a new period 
of Serbian and Albanian national mobilization. 
The 1981 massive protests by Kosovo Albanians seeking social equality 
and greater autonomy for Kosovo (or even an Albanian national unifi-
cation) signaled, as Jović (2009, 183) put it, “the beginning of the state 
crisis of Yugoslavia”. This was later followed by Kosovo Serb mobilization 
for closer links with Serbia and the overcoming of inter-ethnic inequal-
ities. In 1989–1990, Serbia’s leader Slobodan Milošević restricted Koso-
vo’s autonomy and asserted control over the region. As Kosovo Albanians 
resisted this process, Belgrade responded with harsh repression and the 
curtailment of Albanians’ participation in Kosovo’s public sector. In reac-
tion, the local Albanians created their own parallel institutions (Vladis-
avljević 2012, 27–28). Latent tensions in Kosovo escalated into a broader 
armed confrontation in the second half of the 1990s. The conflict between 
the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)/Serbia and the 
Kosovo Albanian insurrection led by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
eventually led to NATO’s military intervention against the FRY/Serbia from 
March to June 1999.
As the conflict came to its end in June 1999, the United Nations Secu-
rity Council (UNSC) adopted a peace framework based on its Resolution 
1244 – which, despite its nominal commitment to FRY’s/Serbia’s territo-
rial integrity and sovereignty, effectively meant the suspension of Belgrade’s 
control over Kosovo. In its place, Resolution 1244 led to the establishment 
of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
a civilian authority that later started partly transferring its competencies to 
local provisional self-governing bodies. The resolution also demanded the 
withdrawal from Kosovo of FRY’s/Serbia’s armed structures (which could, 
however, be deployed under minor, agreed-upon exceptions). Finally, the 
document authorized the deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), an inter-
national NATO-led mission with a mandate for security in Kosovo (Headley 
2008, 416; Ker-Lindsay 2009, 15–20; UN 1999).
The end of the conflict, however, did not immediately lead to a stable, 
peaceful environment. In the early post-war period, many Kosovo Serbs, 
fleeing persecution by Albanians throughout Kosovo, settled in the North, 
whilst part of the Albanian population persecuted by Serbs either fled or 
had its return to the North blocked. This process contributed to reinforce 
traditional Serbian demographic predominance in this part of Kosovo and 
turn it, for Serbs, into a secure area centered in North Mitrovica. The effec-
tive division between North Mitrovica and Albanian-majority Southern 
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Kosovska Mitrovica, accompanied by periodic Serb-Albanian clashes, 
became one of the symbols of the North’s separateness (ICG 2004, 44–52; 
2005; Zupančič 2019, 579–580).
This demographic trend was accompanied by the maintenance of 
Serbian state institutions in Kosovo. Labeled internationally as “parallel 
structures” (OSCE 2003), they defied the institutional framework derived 
from Resolution 1244 – which Belgrade itself had accepted, and encouraged 
Kosovo Serbs to do so, in the early 2000s (Vladisavljević 2019, 176–178).4 
Bolstered by a porous border with Central Serbia, Serbian state struc-
tures became especially strong in the North, where Serbs overwhelmingly 
favored links with Serbia against an Albanian-dominated independent 
Kosovo – on whose behalf the institutional framework derived from the 
international protectorate was often perceived to work (ICG 2005; 2012, 3; 
Zupančič 2019, 580). 
This Serbian Northern Kosovo system was composed of several dimen-
sions. Judicial, educational, healthcare, welfare and public administration 
organs functioned under Serbia’s institutional system (ICG 2005; OSCE 
2003). Serb-run security structures also functioned, obstructing the 
authority of the international protectorate’s and Kosovo’s security struc-
tures. Such was the case of the North Mitrovica-based Bridge Watchers 
(Čuvari mosta) group,5 the Civil Protection (Civilna zaštita, CZ)6 and 
Serbia’s Ministry of Interior (Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova, MUP) staff.7 
4  Belgrade promoted Kosovo Serbs’ participation in the 2001 parliamentary elections under 
Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). It should be noted, however, 
that the turnout in the North, where some local leaders opposed participation, was signifi-
cantly lower than in other Serb-inhabited areas in Kosovo. Following the March 2004 anti-
Serb riots, Serb deputies left the PISG (ICG 2001, 13–19; 2009, 4–5). Additionally, the muni-
cipalities of Leposavić, Zubin Potok and Zvečan held local elections under international 
auspices in 2002, and had partially integrated with UNMIK in the early 2000s (ICG 2005, 5–6).
5  The name comes from the group’s activities on crossings of the Ibar river, especially the 
main bridge linking North and South Mitrovica. Although partly financed by Serbia, the 
Bridge Watchers were mostly of local background. Active mainly in the early post-war years, 
they monitored and mobilized against international forces and Kosovo Albanians (especially 
preventing the latter’s entry in the North) and performed police-like functions. Although 
often seen as reliable security providers by local Serbs, the Bridge Watchers monitored and 
reportedly harassed Serbs who cooperated (or were suspected thereof) with Albanians and 
international institutions. Allegedly, members of the group were also involved in crime (ICG 
2002, 3–13; OSCE 2003, 12–14; 2007, 24–26; Zupančič 2019, 583).
6  The CZ was created by and subordinated to the Northern municipalities, while functio-
ning under Serbia’s funding through municipal budgets. Founded in 2006, it formally dealt 
with emergency response tasks, but also performed security and, allegedly, intelligence 
functions. Many CZ members had military background, and some were believed to be former 
Bridge Watchers (Stakić and Bjeloš 2015, 10–13).
7  MUP staff performed security, police-like activities and the issuing of Serbian docu-




With contested state authority, rule of law was relatively weak, particularly 
in North Mitrovica. Crime (especially smuggling, often run in cooperation 
with Albanians) and political violence/intimidation, often directed against 
Serbs who cooperated with international or Kosovo institutions, became 
elements of the Northern society, generating insecurity and discontent 
among locals (Capussela 2016, 95–96; ICG 2011, 13–20; Insajder 2012).
The Serb-run North also had a party-political dimension. The Northern 
branch of Kosovo Serbs’ Serbian National Council (Srpsko nacionalno veće, 
SNV) was the main local political organization. Through its leadership, 
it was linked to the nationalist-conservative Democratic Party of Serbia 
(Demokratska stranka Srbije, DSS), led by former FRY president (2000–
2003) and Serbian prime minister (2004–2008) Vojislav Koštunica. During 
the 2000s, the DSS became the dominant party in the North. Despite some 
local discontent, the Northern Kosovo Serb leadership enjoyed popular 
legitimacy as administrators and community leaders (ICG 2009; Prelec 
and Rashiti 2015, 6–13).8
Local adherence to and dependence of this system among Northern 
Serbs can be attributed to several factors. First, there was the broad alle-
giance to the notion of a Serbian Kosovo. Second, employment and services 
provided by the Serbian institutions were perceived as good quality ones. 
Third, there was the question of inter-ethnic relations and Serb polit-
ical (dis)enfranchisement in Kosovo. In the aftermath of the war, many 
Kosovo Serbs had experienced various forms of intimidation and violence, 
and their access and use of public services was often hindered. Amid this 
context, Kosovo Serbs often feared ethnic minorization and disrespected 
rights under Priština-centered institutions, even though the Constitutional 
Framework and the electoral system of the post-war international protec-
torate, in principle, guaranteed various rights for national communities 
such as riots. Part of its officers worked covertly for the Kosovo Police (KP, known as Kosovo 
Police Service before Kosovo’s declaration of independence). While the KP did function in 
the North with mostly Serb officers, it was influenced by the Northern Kosovo Serb leader-
ship and largely ineffective and distrusted (being formally a Kosovo institution) (ICG 2005, 
26–27; 2009, 5–6; 2011, 5, 16–19; OSCE 2003, 12–15; 2007, 24–27)
8  The DSS participated in ruling coalitions in Serbia for most of the first post-war decade 
after the fall of the Slobodan Milošević regime in October 2000. Although once favorable to 
EU accession, the party prioritized keeping Kosovo within Serbia over joining the bloc, as the 
EU was perceived as supportive of Kosovo’s independence. This situation, coupled with the 
later recognition of Kosovo’s independence by most EU member states, made the DSS shift to 
an ever more critical stance towards European integration (Vladisavljević 2019, 175–206). The 
SNV was founded by Kosovo Serbs in the late 1990s. Its Northern branch was led by Marko 
Jakšić, a former DSS local leader; and Milan Ivanović, head of North Mitrovica’s regional 
hospital. The Northern SNV was involved in commercial and financial flows from Serbia, as 
well as local patronage networks. It was also believed to be behind political intimidation in 
the North (ICG 2005; 2009, 3–6). 
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(Bieber 2015, 290; Clark 2014, 538–539; ICG 2009; OSCE 2003; Vladisav-
ljević 2012, 30–35). It can be said, thus, that the Serbian Northern Kosovo 
system emerged as a product of both the post-war conditions in the region 
and of the historical Serb-Albanian conflict in and over Kosovo.
To some extent, elements of this Serb-run system functioned some-
what precariously, as it often had limited capabilities and competed or 
overlapped with other institutional frameworks. Nevertheless, it often 
enjoyed the highest degree of authority among Northern Serbs, leading 
to a de facto partition in Kosovo. This situation was partially tolerated by 
international organs, which, fearing instability, sought accommodation 
with the North. In the long run, however, a non-partitioned Kosovo was 
sought by Kosovo Albanian leaders and the Western powers. There were 
failed attempts by Kosovo Albanian leaders and international officials to 
extinguish the Serbian Northern Kosovo system already in the early 2000s 
(ICG 2002; 2005; 2011; OSCE 2003, 2007). 
Challenges to the North also appeared during discussions on Koso-
vo’s final status. A multi-ethnic, non-partitioned Kosovo was one of the 
principles agreed by the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, 
the United Kingdom and the US) for the Belgrade-Priština negotiations 
(Ker-Lindsay 2009).9 While Serbia, supported mainly by Russia, pushed 
for “more than autonomy, less than independence” for Kosovo in the 2006–
2007 talks, Kosovo Albanians wanted independence – a solution favored by 
the US, the leading European countries and part of the UN/UNMIK appa-
ratus (Ker-Lindsay 2009; Roriz 2015). For the Western powers, only inde-
pendence for Kosovo could avoid destabilization by the dissatisfied Alba-
nian majority (Capussela 2016, 87–92; Vladisavljević 2019, 178). 
The talks resulted in Martti Ahtisaari’s (UN’s negotiation envoy) 
“supervised independence” proposal for Kosovo in 2007. The plan was 
supported by the Western powers, who promised backing Kosovo’s inde-
pendence with control of the North in exchange for protection of minor-
ities. The so-called Ahtisaari Plan envisioned autonomy and enhanced 
rights/competencies in administrative, educational, healthcare, finan-
cial and police affairs, as well as funding and cooperation with Serbia, 
for Serb-majority municipalities (during the talks, Kosovo Serbs indeed 
sought control over education, healthcare, security and freedom of move-
ment). Suggestion of Kosovo’s independence, however, meant rejection by 
Serbia and Northern Serbs. Throughout 2007, large Kosovo Serb-organ-
ized rallies took place in North Mitrovica and Belgrade against the Ahti-
saari plan and Kosovo’s independence (Bilbija 2007; Capussela 2016, 99; 
Ker-Lindsay 2009, 41–42, 53–62, 98, 147–165).
9  A formal partition along the North, nevertheless, was discussed during the status talks, 




Facing Serbia’s rejection and Russia’s blocking of independence at 
the UNSC, the Kosovo Albanian leadership, acting in coordination with 
the Western powers, unilaterally declared Kosovo’s independence in 
February 2008. The Ahtisaari Plan became the core of Kosovo’s constitu-
tion (Ker-Lindsay 2009, 1–7; Nogueira 2015, 77–80, 214–224). As expected, 
this was rejected in Belgrade and the North. Despite ruling out military 
action to enforce its claim over Kosovo, Serbia started campaigning against 
the international recognition of Kosovo, strengthening ties with Russia 
for that end. These efforts included the September 2008 request at the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for an advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) about the legality of Kosovo’s declara-
tion of independence (Bieber 2015, 294–295; Economides and Ker-Lindsay 
2015, 1032–1038). In the context of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, 
Northern Serbs were involved in protests, attacks on border posts and 
clashes with international forces in the North (ICG 2008; 2009). The 
government of Serbia demanded Kosovo Serbs boycott Kosovo and EU 
institutions and organized municipal elections in the North in May 2008 
under the Serbian system. Without forceful Western intervention, Priština 
was unable to assert its authority in the North (Capussela 2016, 95–96; ICG 
2008, 2011). De facto partition, thus, remained.
The Western powers saw overcoming partition as a crucial step for 
stability in the Balkans. For American officials, the North’s separateness 
was a dangerous precedent for other ethnic-territorial conflicts in the 
region (Traynor 2010).10 According to such thinking, a North integrated 
into Kosovo would lend credence to multi-ethnic state-building and conse-
quently dismiss secessionisms not supported by the West (Capussela 2016, 
107–111). In this connection, American and EU officials crafted the “Strategy 
for the North”, a Priština-supported plan launched in 2009/2010 aiming 
to weaken the Serbian Northern Kosovo system and strengthen Kosovo’s 
authority in the North through peaceful means. It was strongly rebuffed 
by Northern Serbs (ICG 2011, 9–11). 
10  American fears of a partitioned Kosovo date back to the war and its immediate after-
math. During talks on the international peace framework for Kosovo in 1999, Russian repre-
sentatives sought a Russia-commanded security sector in Northern Kosovo. The operational 
plan around the June 1999 Priština Dash also envisioned the possibility of the independent 
establishment of a Northern Russia-controlled sector. Taking into account the implications 
for NATO’s role in Kosovo of Russia’s (potential) autonomous behavior and pro-Serbian incli-
nations, US officials feared such Russian presence could lead to a de facto partition along 
the North. Eventually, however, it was agreed that Russian troops would participate in KFOR 
without their own sector, deployed mainly in Albanian-populated rural areas (rather than in 
the North) and as part of a single NATO command structure. In 2003, the Russian govern-
ment, alleging lack of strategic interests in the Balkans and implicitly acknowledging its rela-
tively weak influence over KFOR’s operations, withdrew the Russian contingent (Gus’kova 
2013, 251–257; Headley 2008, 393–416, 462).
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Challenges to the North were also sown in Belgrade. Following Serbia’s 
May 2008 parliamentary election, the DSS was sidelined by the more 
pro-Western Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka, DS) led by pres-
ident Boris Tadić. Under Western interference, the DS formed a coali-
tion with the Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije, SPS 
– formerly led by Slobodan Milošević), which embraced the European inte-
gration agenda on its path back to power (SPS 2010, 23–25; Trapara 2016, 
213; Vladisavljević 2019, 202–206). 
Although not all of its members recognize Kosovo’s independence, the 
EU conditioned Serbia’s integration with cooperative relations on/with 
Kosovo. The DS-led coalition, thus, despite not giving up the Serbian 
Northern Kosovo system and non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence, 
started pursuing a more flexible Kosovo policy. This included acceptance of 
the EU’s rule of law mission (EULEX) in the North and attempts to weaken 
the DSS-linked Northern Serb elite. Relations between the Northern Serb 
leadership and Belgrade started deteriorating (ICG 2011, 3–4; Vladisav-
ljević 2019, 252–253). 
More serious Serbian concessions came after the ICJ’s July 2010 verdict, 
which did not consider Kosovo’s declaration of independence a violation 
of international law. Under Brussels’s pressure, the Serbian government 
proposed a joint resolution with the EU at the UNGA in September 2010 
giving the EU a “status-neutral” mandate to mediate a Belgrade-Priština 
dialogue (Bieber 2015, 294–297; Vladisavljević 2019, 253). According to the 
document, the dialogue would be a “factor for peace, security and stability 
in the region”, aimed to “achieve progress on the path to the European 
Union and improve the lives of the people” (UN 2010). Its approval signaled 
the beginning of the EU-mediated dialogue.
3. The North and the technical  
dialogue (2011–2012)
The EU-mediated, US-supported Serbia-Kosovo negotiations began 
with the so-called technical dialogue launched in March 2011. It dealt 
with seemingly neutral issues without explicitly addressing sensitive 
questions like Kosovo’s statehood and its recognition by Serbia. Agree-
ments were reached in 2011–2012 on freedom of movement, civil registry, 
custom stamps, cadastre, university diplomas and Kosovo’s participation 
in regional cooperation initiatives (Đukanović 2013, 367–372; Emini and 
Stakić 2018, 4). 
Despite its supposedly neutral nature, this phase did have serious 
implications for the North. In the context of trade talks, the government of 
Kosovo, aiming to enforce an embargo on Serbian goods (itself a retaliation 




fully attempted to establish control over border points in the North with 
special police units in July 2011. The attempt met violent resistance, as the 
operation was widely regarded by Northern Kosovo Serbs as an invasion 
challenging their community. This prompted confrontations with Kosovo 
and, for the following 18 months, EULEX and KFOR forces (both effectively 
aligned with Priština during the crisis) (Capussela 2016, 102–104; ICG 2012, 
1–10; 2013, 1).11 Despite initial support for Northern Serb resistance, Serbia 
relented under Western pressure and withdrew its backing. In December 
2011, a Belgrade-Priština deal was reached on Integrated Border-Boundary 
Management (IBM). Implemented by Serbia’s next ruling coalition in 
2012/2013, it effectively enhanced Priština’s control over the Northern 
border and customs, triggering protests in the North (Đukanović 2013, 
370–371; ICG 2013, 10–18; Mirović 2019, 54–58).
Amid this context, Northern Serbs, seeking protection, participated in 
a collective Kosovo Serb petition asking Russia for Russian citizenship in 
November 2011. Criticized by the Serbian government, the petition gath-
ered about 20,000 signatures, but was eventually declined by the Russian 
government (which, on the other hand, sent humanitarian aid to Kosovo 
Serbs) (Politika 2011; Samedova 2012; Solov’ev 2011). In February 2012, 
a locally organized referendum on Kosovo institutions was held in the 
North. Rejected by official Belgrade, Priština and international actors, the 
voting had around 26,000 participants, of which 99.74% rejected Kosovo 
institutions (Bieber 2015, 304; RTS 2012).
Pressures of the EU and its leading states, coupled with Belgrade’s 
awareness of economic dependence towards the EU, were crucial for 
Serbia’s policy shift towards normalization negotiations after the ICJ 
opinion. German pressure was particularly strong: prime minister Angela 
Merkel openly demanded the abolition of Serbian “parallel structures” 
during a visit to Belgrade in August 2011 (Economides and Ker-Lindsay 
2015, 1034–1039; ICG 2012, 6–14). This process generated a deepening 
Belgrade-North rift. 
In 2012, Serbia went through political changes with significant implica-
tions for normalization. The Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska napredna 
stranka, SNS) won parliamentary elections and formed a coalition with the 
SPS and other minor parties, a scenario that would repeat itself following 
parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2016. SNS leaders Tomislav Nikolić 
and Aleksandar Vučić also won presidential elections in 2012 and 2017 
respectively.
11  Allegedly, vested interests of influential members of the Northern Kosovo Serb commu-
nity in smuggling also significantly contributed to the escalation of the conflict (Insajder 
2012).
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Тhe SNS was born in 2008 when Nikolić, followed by Vučić, left the 
traditionally ultranationalist, popular Serbian Radical Party (Srpska 
radikalna stranka, SRS) to form the new party of more moderate views 
on the Kosovo question and European integration (Vladisavljević 2019, 
204–205, 277–289). Despite its leaders’ past in the SRS, as well as the new 
party’s declared non-acceptance of Kosovo’s independence and of the 
abolition of the Serbian Northern Kosovo system, the SNS, which also 
criticized past governments’ Kosovo policies, advocated EU accession and 
negotiations on Kosovo – even admitting openness to possible “painful 
concessions” on both sides in order to achieve a solution for the Kosovo 
question (SNS 2011, 37–42).
SNS’s EU-amenable stances, including on Kosovo, made the party-led 
governments gain Western support (Vladisavljević 2019, 285–287). With 
discredited domestic rivals, the SNS, through its popular leadership 
centered on the figure of Vučić;12 a large party and patronage network; 
cooptation and constraints towards opponents; and manipulation of state 
institutions and media, became Serbia’s strongest political force, scoring 
expressive electoral victories and consolidating itself at the top of a regime 
with authoritarian features (Bieber 2020, 42–53; Pavlović 2020; Vladisa- 
vljević 2019, 277–313). The new Serbian leadership, increasingly centered 
on Vučić, started pushing an ambitious Kosovo agenda with serious impli-
cations for the North.
4. The North amid the political dialogue  
and beyond (2012–…)
The Serbia-Kosovo so-called political dialogue started in October 2012, 
while in January 2013 the Serbian government announced and adopted its 
guidelines for the negotiations. The documents stated that Serbia would 
not accept Kosovo’s independence. Tellingly, on the other hand, it was 
acknowledged that normalization had given a degree of legitimacy to 
Kosovo’s institutions and that the talks should deal with the “overcoming 
of institutional parallelisms”. Serbia would implement past normalization 
agreements and seek an agreed, comprehensive solution for the Kosovo 
dispute, as well security and rights for Serbs inside Kosovo. Serbia would 
also seek autonomy for Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo, which 
would have the right to cooperation with and financial support from 
12  Although keeping ties with the party, Nikolić left the SNS after his 2012 presidential 
election victory, paving the way for Vučić’s consolidation as SNS’s sole leader (Bieber 2020, 50; 
Vladisavljević 2019, 286, 293–294). Before becoming president in 2017, Vučić was prime mini-




Belgrade. Finally, the negotiations should contribute to Serbia’s EU inte-
gration (Serbia 2013b, 2013c). 
This approach was reflected in the landmark Brussels Agreement (offi-
cially the “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of 
Relations”) of April 2013, which stipulated the integration of Serbia-af-
filiated police, security and judiciary personnel into Kosovo institutions 
according to ethnic proportionality. A Kosovo-wide Association/Commu-
nity of Serb-majority Municipalities (Zajednica srpskih opština, ZSO) 
would be established under Kosovo’s laws – but allowing funding from 
Serbia – with overview of economic, education, healthcare, social, urban 
and rural policies. Finally, municipalities would be formed and elections 
held in the North within Kosovo’s institutional framework (Serbia 2013a; 
2015).13 As a reward for the agreement, Serbia started EU accession talks in 
January 2014, with normalization included in the 35th negotiation chapter 
(Bieber 2015, 316). 
The Brussels Agreement and its complements, thus, directly challenged 
the Serbian Northern Kosovo system. Since 2013, despite varying speed and 
remaining implementation disputes, key structures like police, security 
(MUP and CZ) and judiciary faced dismantling, with Serb officers being 
absorbed into equivalent Kosovo institutions – which, in turn, became 
more present in the North.14 Meanwhile, ZSO’s implementation has barely 
progressed (BPRG 2017; Dragojlov 2020; Emini and Stakić 2018, 6; Serbia 
2018; 2019b). 
These concessions did not mean, however, that Serbia fully accepted 
Kosovo’s statehood and the complete extinction of the Serbian Northern 
Kosovo system. Serbia has kept an enduring policy of non-recognition 
of Kosovo’s independence during the normalization process. The Brus-
sels Agreement, for example, was not ratified by the Serbian parliament, 
thus avoiding the implication of it having an international nature. A 
13  A controversial complement of the 2013 negotiations that relates to recent security inci-
dents in the North is NATO’s role as security guarantor in the region, obtained at Serbia’s 
insistence (Đukanović 2013, 373). Serbia has claimed that Kosovo special police units and 
the Kosovo Security Force (KSF, Kosovo’s army in the making), can enter the North only 
with KFOR’s and Northern Serb representatives’ consent. KFOR and NATO, however, have 
claimed such agreement exists only regarding the KSF and do not mention the need for 
Northern Kosovo Serb representatives’ authorization (B92 2019; Serbia 2018, 10–12; 2019b; 
Tuhina 2019). An official letter made public in 2020 shows that in 2013 Hashim Thaçi, then 
Kosovo’s prime minister, assured NATO that the KSF would operate in the North only with 
prior concurrence from KFOR. The letter also states that KFOR “may engage with legiti-
mate representatives of the local community in Northern Kosovo” as part of such concur-
rence process (EWB 2020b).
14  According to some sources, however, integrated police, security and judiciary personnel 
kept receiving pensions and compensations from the Serbian government, and were still seen 
as influenced by Belgrade even after the Brussels Agreement (Dragojlov 2020, 5–8).
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similar view was adopted by the Serbian Constitutional Court, which also 
affirmed that the Brussels Agreement did not determine Kosovo’s final 
status (Bieber 2015, 307). Finally, Serbia has campaigned to block Kosovo’s 
entry in some international organizations and for UN members to with-
draw recognition of Kosovo’s independence (Serbia 2019b). The Serbian 
government has at times shown a confrontational posture towards Priština, 
while pro-government tabloid media has often exhibited a chauvinistic 
rhetoric towards non-Serb nations in the regional neighborhood and a 
sensationalist discourse about supposedly imminent wars to be initiated 
by Kosovo Albanians (Đorđević 2019; Vladisavljević 2019, 304–310). Serbian 
national symbols remained filling the Northern landscape, visually sign-
aling the region’s enduring specificity.
Serbian institutions, on which Serbs still largely rely, kept functioning 
in Kosovo, including in the North – to a degree tolerated by Priština, but 
nevertheless criticized by Kosovo Albanian politicians (Andrić Rakić 2020; 
Loxha 2019; Prelec and Rashiti 2015, 30). Municipal administrative organs 
under the Serbian institutional system, whose officials sometimes simul-
taneously have posts in Kosovo institutions, still function (Kossev 2020; 
Loxha 2019). Serbian education, welfare and healthcare systems keep 
functioning, and the Serbian government has provided public spending 
and investments, donations and other kinds of support for Kosovo Serbs 
(sometimes in coordination with Priština and the EU) (Andrić Rakić 2020; 
HCHRS 2019; Kossev 2019c; Serbia 2018, 24–25; 2019b). 
Finally, employment and income remained largely provided by Serbia. 
Estimates of Northern Kosovo Serbs relying on the Serbian budget range 
from 52.2% to as many as 80% (Jović and Nešović 2015, 22–23; Andrić Rakić 
2017; Fazliu 2017; Prelec and Rashiti 2015). These factors, alongside the 
broad allegiance to the Serbian claim over Kosovo and potential prob-
lems regarding inter-ethnic relations and political (dis)enfranchisement 
under the Priština institutional system, contribute to the maintenance of 
the widespread Northern Serb sense of loyalty, belonging and depend-
ence towards Serbia.
The Serbian government has attempted to offset normalization conces-
sions through other channels of influence in Kosovo. This has been done 
mainly via Kosovo Serbs’ participation in Kosovo’s political system, taking 
advantage of the latter’s ethnic representation and veto rights, as well as 
running Kosovo system municipalities with Serb majority. To this end, 
a new party-list controlled by the Serbian government, the Serbian List 
(Srpska lista, SL), was established in an attempt to unify Kosovo Serb 
politics under Belgrade’s control. In the North, this meant the replace-
ment of the old anti-integration leadership. This strategy was reinforced 




its inception, the SL has participated in coalitions and/or taken ministe-
rial posts under every government in Kosovo), as well as with the reconfig-
ured Northern Kosovo Serb elite linked to the party (Bieber 2015, 308–310; 
Butcher 2020; EWB 2020a; Fazliu 2017; Kossev 2019b; Milivojevic 2019; 
Mirović 2019, 119–128; Prelec and Rashiti 2015, 12–13; Zupančič 2019).
With impressive electoral results,15 the SL, labeled by the Serbian 
government as a “state project”, came to power in Serb-majority munici-
palities and virtually monopolized Serb parliamentary representation in 
Kosovo (RFE 2019; Kossev 2019b; Serbia 2019a). Therefore, while certain 
policies of the Serbian government indeed meant a degree of legitimi-
zation of Priština’s institutions, it can be argued, on the other hand, 
that the Kosovo Albanian leadership accepted a stake for Serbia in what 
Bieber (2015, 302) called a “de facto degree of shared sovereignty in parts 
of Kosovo”.
The North Mitrovica-based SL affirms support both for the normal-
ization process and Resolution 1244 (implying alignment with the reso-
lution’s reference to Serbia’s territorial integrity) (SL N.d.). SL’s rise can 
be partly attributed to genuine political loyalty towards Serbia among 
Northern Kosovo Serbs. However, this trajectory has also been marked by 
controversial circumstances that in some ways reproduce certain author-
itarian features in Serbia’s recent political history. There is the question, 
for example, of the use of state resources to foster compliance with the SL. 
Vučić himself, ahead of the 2019 Kosovo parliamentary election, publicly 
associated SL’s electoral success with the maintenance of Serbian sala-
ries in education and healthcare (RTS 2019), thus suggesting Belgrade’s 
awareness of public sector dependence as a source of political influence 
over Kosovo Serbs.
In this connection, there are also reports of pressures on employees at 
Serbian institutions in the North (and throughout Kosovo) through means 
like collective voting and threats of dismissal (Jović, Andrić and Marink-
ović 2017, 44; Marinković, Timotijević and Kostić 2019, 33–34; Trivić and 
Loxha 2019). Similar practices attributed to SNS activists are also reported 
to have occurred during elections in Serbia (Pavlović 2020, 25–26). 
Belgrade’s strategy of monopolizing Kosovo Serb politics was also 
accompanied by the SL’s portrayal of opponents and alternative political 
forces as traitors of the nation and a threat to Serbian unity in Kosovo. This 
has often been done in a language that resembles that of Serbian govern-
15  In Kosovo’s 2019 mayoral and parliamentary elections, for example, the SL got an average 
around 94% and 87% of votes, respectively, in the North (KCEC 2019a; 2019b). When it comes 
to Serbia’s elections, SL’s patrons in Belgrade scored similar degrees of electoral support. In 
the 2020 Serbian parliamentary election, the SNS-led electoral coalition received an average 
85% of the votes in the North (Serbia 2020).
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ment and SNS officials, as well as the virulent rhetoric of pro-government 
media towards opponents and critics of Vučić.16 Taking into account the 
strong political and material attachment many Northern Kosovo Serbs 
have towards Serbia, the aforementioned factors constitute important tools 
of influence with constraining effects for democracy and political pluralism 
in the North.
Finally, there are reports and accusations of pressure, intimidation and 
even physical attacks against citizens, politicians and political groupings 
not aligned or critical of the SL, the Serbian government and the shadowy 
informal power “structures” believed to be linked to the Serbian govern-
ment and to actually run politics and crime in the North (Emini and Stakić 
2018, 6; Milivojevic 2019; Zupančič 2019, 581–587). Such reports also indi-
cate that intimidation and political violence, as well as rule of law weak-
ness, persist in the North, but not facing, as Zupančič (2019) noted, a 
strong rebuttal by the EU. 
How do Northern Kosovo Serbs perceive these developments? Despite 
being among the ones most affected by normalization, Kosovo Serbs, 
including those from the North, were not meaningfully included in the 
process, a fact that shows an authoritarian facet of normalization. This 
happened despite the Serbian government stating that Kosovo Serbs would 
be heard during the negotiations (Jović and Nešović 2015, 11–12; Serbia 
2013c). Additionally, there was ambiguity and lack of transparency, tricks 
the EU hoped would advance negotiations. Among Kosovo Serbs, this 
created sentiments of confusion, exclusion and the perception of being a 
mere bargaining chip in EU integration processes (Bieber 2015, 308–319; 
BPRG 2017, 24–26). 
Public opinion surveys indicate that sentiments of this kind are wide-
spread in the North. A 2016 poll, for example, found that around 70% of 
Northern Kosovo Serbs did not understand fully the ZSO agreement or 
see a citizens’ role in its implementation (BPRG 2017, 39–40). Usually, few 
people expected that the ZSO would improve Serbs’ position in Kosovo. 
Since 2015, support for the Brussels Agreement has on average reached 
about 15%. While a resigned majority in 2015 supported Serbs’ participa-
tion in Kosovo institutions, such support became minoritarian, averaging 
about 24% in 2016-2018. Usually fewer than 10% of citizens believed the 
Brussels Agreement unambiguously improved Kosovo Serbs’ rights and 
freedoms (Jović and Nešović 2015, 13–15, 35; Jović, Andrić and Ostojić 2016, 
16  See, for example, SL’s communiqué in the aftermath of the 2019 Kosovo parliamentary 
election (SL 2019). For broader analyses of the rhetoric of representatives of the Serbian gover-
nment, the SNS and pro-government media, as well as their relations, see Bieber (2020, 93, 




14–22, 25, 31; Jović, Andrić and Marinković 2017, 4, 27–35, 39–40, 47; Jović, 
Waugh and Marinković 2018, 22–32, 40). 
Finally, in 2019, 66% of Northern Kosovo Serbs, indicating a belief that 
(whole) Kosovo should be Serbian, opposed a “delineation” (razgraničenje) 
between Serbia and Kosovo – an idea commonly understood as containing 
an official territorial partition in the region with the North recognized as 
Serbia’s territory. Serbian and some EU, US and Kosovo Albanian officials 
have recently indicated openness to this idea as a basis for a final normal-
ization agreement (Marinković, Timotijević and Kostić 2019, 53–56; Kole-
snikov 2018; Surk 2019; Xharra, 2020). 
Satisfaction with and trust in Kosovo’s and international institutions 
remained generally lower than in the Serbian government and Serb-run 
institutions, despite low trust rates in Kosovo Serb politicians and the 
existence of perceptions of the normalization-era, Belgrade-controlled 
Northern Serb leadership as illegitimate. The EU – often seen as biased, 
pro-Albanian – and the US are lowly rated as actors Kosovo Serbs can rely 
on in the pursuit of their interests. Both have sharply lower trust rates 
than Russia. The general political, security and economic environment in 
Kosovo has been rated overwhelmingly negatively,17 with acute perception 
of authoritarianism, criminality and weak rule of law. Since 2016, growing 
percentages of Northern Kosovo Serbs (as many as 78% in 2018) have 
claimed not to feel free to publicly express their political positions. Crime 
has constantly been cited among the top security risks/problems, some-
times ahead of ethnic-related and military issues (BPRG 2017, 35–36; CBS 
2018; Jović and Nešović 2015, 28–30; Jović, Andrić and Ostojić 2016, 16–19, 
28–34; Jović, Andrić and Marinković 2017; 25–31, 43–46, 51; Jović, Waugh 
and Marinković 2018, 20–25, 35, 39–40, 45; Marinković, Timotijević and 
Kostić 2019, 44). 
These critical assessments are present in Northern Kosovo Serb polit-
ical life and, like at the time of the technical dialogue, generated political 
mobilization. In 2013, for example, the Brussels Agreement was rejected 
by some Northern Serb representatives. Protests against normalization 
agreements led by the old Northern Kosovo Serb leadership were held in 
Belgrade and the North, attracting thousands of citizens (Al Jazeera 2013; 
Mirović 2019, 99–105). Despite Belgrade’s pressure for participation and 
the SL’s eventual (and controversial) victory, the first local elections under 
17  Between around 2/3 to 4/5 of interviewed Northern Kosovo Serbs usually assessed the 
situation as bad or very bad in these three realms, with little expectation of life improvements 
for Kosovo Serbs in the near future. Polls also registered growing willingness to emigrate, 
especially among the youth (Jović and Nešović 2015, 12, 20, 27, 38; Jović, Andrić and Ostojić 
2016, 9–11, 31–32; Jović, Andrić and Marinković 2017, 12–15, 49; Jović, Waugh and Marinković 
2018, 10–12, 41–42; Marinković, Timotijević and Kostić 2019, 12–15)
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Kosovo’s system in 2013–2014 were largely rejected by the old Northern Serb 
leadership and the Serb community, often resulting in low turnouts (Bieber 
2015, 309–310; Đukanović 2013, 378–379; Mirović 2019, 119–124; Zupančič 
2019, 590). Criticism of the Serbian government, the SL and the “struc-
tures” based on above mentioned factors has been publicly voiced by some 
Northern Serb politicians, irrespective of their stance on Kosovo institu-
tions (Fazliu 2017; Milivojevic 2019). There have also been individual acts 
of resistance against the Serbian government’s integration policy.18
Part of the old, weakened DSS-linked Northern Kosovo Serb leader-
ship, like veteran politicians Marko Jakšić and Slaviša Ristić, regrouped in 
the hardline nationalist Otadžbina (“Fatherland”) National Movement of 
Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija (Narodni pokret Srba sa Kosova i Metohije 
’Otadžbina’). Founded in 2017, Otadžbina advocates the boycott of Kosovo 
institutions, including elections. Harshly critical of Vučić, it joined the 
Alliance for Serbia (Savez za Srbiju, SzS), Serbia’s main opposition group 
in the 2018–2020 period, which rejected recognition of Kosovo’s independ-
ence (Kossev 2019a; SzS N.d.). Otadžbina also joined SzS’s successor coali-
tion, the United Opposition of Serbia (Udružena opozicija Srbije, UOS) 
(N1 2020). Otadžbina has urged Russia to take an assertive stance against 
Kosovo’s independence as a counterweight to what the organization sees as 
the Serbian government’s treasonous Kosovo policy under Vučić (Otadž-
bina 2018).19
Opposition in the North was also prominently represented by Oliver 
Ivanović. A former Bridge Watcher and state secretary at Serbia’s ministry 
for Kosovo and Metohija (who later adopted more moderate stances, 
including competing in Kosovo system elections), Ivanović was the leader 
of the Civic Initiative Freedom, Democracy and Justice (Građanska inicija-
tiva Sloboda, Demokratija, Pravda – GI SDP) and fierce critic of the polit-
ical forces and trends in normalization-era North. His unresolved assassi-
nation in January 2018, commonly believed to be an intra-Serb politically 
motivated episode, became a symbol of political and security problems in 
normalization-era North (Milivojević 2019; Zupančič 2019, 582).20
18  For example, North Mitrovica mayoral elections in 2013–2014 were rerun because of 
the winner’s refusal to take the oath of office with Kosovo state symbols (Bieber 2015, 310). 
Years later, some Serb judges refused to work in Kosovo’s institutions (Mirović 2019, 186–191).
19  In what are often believed to be politically motivated episodes, Otadžbina’s headquarters 
in North Mitrovica were destroyed in a fire in 2017, and Jakšić and Ristić had their property 
attacked since 2012 (Milivojevic 2019; Mirović 2019, 104; Zupančič 2019, 582).
20  Before his murder, Ivanović was harshly attacked in pro-government media in Serbia. 
Ivanović’s family also suffered intimidation, and GI SDP’s property was attacked. Four years 
before Ivanović’s murder, his friend Dimitrije Janićijević, another Northern Kosovo Serb 




The Serbia-wide “1 out of 5 million” anti-government demonstrations 
launched in 2018, which protested mainly against the deteriorated state 
of democracy in the country, but also against the SNS-led governments’ 
policy on Kosovo, were also held in the North in 2019 with the partici-
pation of Otadžbina and other local political actors. Demonstrators also 
demanded the solving of the assassination of Oliver Ivanović (Kossev 
2019d). Due to resource disparity, lack of external support, political divi-
sions and the specificity of relations between the Northern Kosovo Serb 
community and Serbia, opposition activity did not grow so far to strongly 
impact the political status quo in the North. Nevertheless, it does point 
to latent challenges to the legitimacy and sustainability of normalization 
originating from dissatisfaction and insecurity with this process and asso-
ciated trends.
5. Conclusion
North Kosovo emerged from the 1990s Kosovo war as the focus of a new 
dispute in the Balkans whose roots can be traced to the historical Serb-Al-
banian conflict within and over Kosovo. Defying the civilian and security 
authority framework under international auspices established in Kosovo in 
1999, as well as Kosovo state authority and its Western backers after Koso-
vo’s 2008 declaration of independence, the North’s predominantly Serb 
population articulated with Belgrade to maintain a Serbia-supported self-
rule system in the region. Highly integrated into Serbia’s political system, it 
included judicial, educational, welfare, healthcare, public administration 
and security structures, leading to a de facto partition in Kosovo. 
This began to change from 2011, when the normalization dialogue 
aimed at EU accession was launched. The Serbian government, under 
Western pressure and aware of economic dependence towards the EU, 
made key concessions in exchange for the advancement of its EU acces-
sion negotiations. Successive deals, particularly elements of the Brussels 
Agreement, to a great extent dismantled the Serbian Northern Kosovo 
system. They also led to a degree of extension of Kosovo’s authority to the 
North and promoted local Serbs’ participation in Kosovo’s political system 
– goals long championed in Western conceptions of geopolitical stability 
in the Balkans.
This article analyzed political and security trends in the North during 
the normalization process, focusing on perspectives from the Northern 
Kosovo Serb community in the face of the interests and policies of the 
governments of Serbia, Kosovo and the US, as well as of the EU and its 
leading states. As the discussion indicated, normalization has had an 
authoritarian facet and generated discontent seen in several features of 
the region. Northern Kosovo Serbs and their old leadership overwhelm-
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ingly rejected Kosovo state authority, a fact that meant that the legitimacy 
of normalization and its outcomes were locally contested from their very 
beginning. Additionally, Northern Serbs, which were among the ones most 
impacted by the agreements, were not meaningfully included in the nego-
tiations. Already at the time of the technical dialogue, dissatisfaction with 
aspects of normalization and the possibility of the extension of Priština’s 
authority to the North translated into resistance mobilization by local 
actors, including in violent forms. 
Although their sources sometimes were not new phenomena, signs of 
discontent, dissatisfaction and insecurity in the North kept widespread 
during normalization, as shown by diverse survey data. These perceptions 
often had to do both with formal aspects of normalization, like the Brus-
sels Agreement and its consequences; and tacit/political ones, like the way 
the Serbian SNS-led governments and their local allies asserted their domi-
nance over Northern Kosovo Serb politics. Lack of improvement of secu-
rity and rule of law were also strongly perceived. Such negative assessments 
about the political, economic and security environment in the North belie 
normalization’s promises of improvements in the region. Unsurprisingly, 
in this context, the prestige of the EU and the US – normalization’s key 
international promoters – is significantly tarnished among Northern Serbs. 
Political opposition mobilization, although so far not able to strongly 
impact the status quo in the region due to factors like relative lack of 
political and organizational strength, has appeared in connection with 
the several perceived political and security problems in normalization-era 
North. In view of these factors, it can be said that the experience of normal-
ization-era North indicates that “stabilocratic” arrangements can meet 
some of the interests of their promoters at the central government and 
international levels. On the other hand, however, the way the normaliza-
tion dialogue and associated processes developed led to sources of dissat-
isfaction and political counter-mobilization at a local level, thus pointing 
to latent challenges to the legitimacy and sustainability of normalization 
and its outcomes in North Kosovo.
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